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Renegotiating the European Union’s free movement and 





The EU’s freedom of movement has increasingly been brought into question in the last few years as 
member states have restricted social benefits for EU migrants. Britain proposed in-work benefit 
restrictions for economically active EU migrants in intergovernmental negotiations leading up to the 
referendum on its membership to the EU. Access to social benefits is an important component of free 
movement. It provides EU citizens with social rights in host member states, which promotes internal 
migration. Restricting free movement threatens European integration because it is a fundamental EU 
treaty right. This article analyses Britain’s preferences towards the EU’s free movement and social 
security coordination policies leading up to the Brexit referendum. Britain’s identity, and conceptions 
of statehood and European integration were the main determinants of state action. Britain’s desire to 
restrict these policies significantly influenced its decision to leave the EU, which fundamentally 
changed the trajectory of European integration. 
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Introduction 
The free movement of people throughout the European Union (EU) has increasingly 
been brought into question in the last few years as some member states have restricted, 
or attempted to restrict, EU migrants’ right to access social benefits. The most 
pertinent example of this was Britain’s desire to reshape the EU’s free movement and 
social security coordination policies, leading up to the referendum on its membership 
of the EU, so that it conformed with Britain’s interests. In a letter to Donald Tusk, the 
President of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister David Cameron proposed 
restrictions to EU migrants’ right to access in-work benefits until they had resided and 
worked in Britain for four years (Cameron, 2015a, 5). The proposal was widely 
criticised by the EU and other member states on the grounds that it undermined the 
principle of free movement because social rights provide EU migrants with protections 
in host member states, which promotes free movement (Leonard, 2015, 1-2; Ruparel, 
Booth, Scarpetta, 2015, 5, 7-11). In the lead-up to the Brexit referendum, this issue was 
a litmus test for the future of British-European relations and the trajectory of the EU, 
as Cameron stated that he would only support Britain remaining in the EU if his 
proposal was implemented through EU reform. Further, Britain’s desire to restrict 
these policies significantly influenced its decision to leave the EU, which 




If implemented, Cameron’s policy would not have overtly violated the principle of free 
movement — affirmed through the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and the European Parliament and Council of the European Union's Directive 
2004/38/EC — because it did not restrict their rights to enter and reside in Britain. 
However, it would have violated the principle of non-discrimination, which is affirmed 
in the aforementioned European legislation and the EU’s social security coordination 
policies, the European Parliament and Council’s Regulations 883/2004 and 
987/2009. Therefore, the EU’s free movement and social security coordination policies 
do not allow for member states to restrict benefits for economically active EU migrants. 
Cameron’s proposal would be discriminatory because economically active EU migrants 
would have inferior employment and social rights compared with British citizens in the 
same job. Moreover, EU citizens would also have to contribute to Britain’s welfare 
system for four years before they gained the right to access it. Therefore, Cameron’s 
proposal would have affected freedom of movement because the principle of non-
discrimination and the EU’s social security coordination policies encourage internal 
migration, and ensure that it functions as intended. 
Due to the shape of European integration, it was necessary for Cameron to pursue this 
proposal through intergovernmental negotiations, rather than solely through domestic 
implementation. The ECJ would likely have overturned the policy if it was 
implemented without an agreement being reached at the European level (Cusick, 2016, 
1). Cameron included the proposal in his broader EU reform agenda, which was 
particularly important because it appeared likely that member states would support 
the rest of his reform agenda due to the moderate nature of Cameron’s other proposals. 
This article analyses Britain’s approaches and interests to the EU’s free movement and 
social security coordination policies, until January 2016 when Prime Minister David 
Cameron toured the continent to garner support for this proposal amongst the EU and 
member states. Britain’s identity and preferred conceptions of statehood and 
European integration were the most important determinants of the Cameron 
premiership’s desire to restrict the EU’s free movement and social security 
coordination policies. Britain primarily views the EU as an economic integration 
project, which advances its economic interests, and opposes integration that it 
perceives to undermine British sovereignty. Cameron’s assertive and eurosceptic 
approach to British-EU relations was also influenced by Britain’s European and 
domestic social, economic and political preferences. 
Britain’s European Interests 
Sovereignty 
Cameron's proposal to restrict in-work benefits for EU migrants fundamentally sought 
to weaken Britain’s obligations to the EU’s free movement and social security 
coordination policies, in order to redirect sovereignty from the European to the nation-
state level of governance. He believed that London should have the authority to 
determine Britain’s policies in these areas, so that it could control EU migrants’ entry, 
residence and welfare eligibility in a way that ensured these policies conformed with 
Britain's domestic preferences (Cameron, 2014, 1; Cameron, 2015a, 4-5; Cameron, 
2015b, 7-8). This perspective demonstrated Cameron’s increasingly assertive and 
eurosceptic approach to British-EU relations. It also reflected the notion that the 
British government should be held to account by the British parliament and public, 
Milton, ANZJES 10(2) 
 
4 
rather than European level political actors because these are politically salient policy 
areas, especially due to the perception that benefit tourism was prevalent amongst EU 
migrants in Britain (Costello & Hancox, 2014, 4; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015, 1). This 
perspective was particularly pertinent because a state’s immigration and social welfare 
policies are overtly linked to its sovereignty as they affect the bargain between state 
and society, which is a fundamental component of a state’s identity. Hence, Cameron’s 
proposal was strongly influenced by Britain’s underlying conception of statehood, in 
which it valued its independence and sovereignty. These values were often prioritised 
over London’s obligations to the EU because it had not adopted a Europeanised 
identity,1 and the perception that Britain could succeed outside of the EU remained 
prevalent. Therefore, Britain’s support for the EU was contingent on the perception 
that its membership promoted Britain’s economic interests, because London primarily 
conceived of the EU as an economic integration project, which did not supersede the 
nation-state or undermine its sovereignty; although economic integration still has 
implications on a state’s sovereignty insofar as economic integration alters the state’s 
ability to formulate economic policy. In comparison, a number of other member-states 
considered the EU to be a political integration project, which involved, to an extent, 
the transfer of sovereignty to the EU. Notably, Cameron’s broader EU reform agenda 
primarily focused on redirecting sovereignty and ensuring that the EU advanced 
Britain's national and economic interests (Cameron, 2015b, 8-10). Accordingly, in-
work benefit restrictions were prominent in Cameron’s public discourse, in an attempt 
to justify and gain public support for his EU reform agenda, because immigration and 
social welfare policies are politically salient issues, which resonate amongst the public. 
In contrast Cameron’s proposals on economic governance and competitiveness were 
technocratic and largely removed from his public discourse. Cameron’s proposals to 
restrict in-work benefits for recent EU migrants reflected his Government's desire to 
implement policies that conformed with Britain’s perceived contemporary preferences. 
Influence in Shaping European Integration 
Cameron’s desire to reduce Britain’s obligations to the EU’s free movement and social 
security coordination policies were also influenced by London’s negligible influence in 
shaping these policies through successive EU treaty reform. Britain, under the 
Thatcher premiership, significantly influenced the initial shape of the single market 
and, by extension, freedom of movement through the Single European Act 1986. The 
Thatcher Government ensured that the single market was established on the basis of 
market integration and liberalisation, which conformed with Britain’s liberal market 
economy that lacked state intervention. Due to Britain’s euroscepticism, the Thatcher 
Government sought to reduce the extent of political integration within the single 
market. Accordingly, it was more hesitant to liberalise the free movement of people 
and sought to limit this right to the free movement of labour because it did not want to 
cede significant control of Britain’s immigration control policies to Europe, as that 
would diminish British sovereignty (Allen, 111; Moravcsik, 1991, 28,31-32; Moravcsik, 
1998, 314-379). However, Britain had a negligible influence over subsequent treaty 
reforms that extended the principle of free movement that reduced barriers to internal 
migration by providing EU migrants with social rights in host member states. The 
Conservative Government, under the premierships of Thatcher and her successor, 
                                                      
1 Radaelli (2003, p. 30) defines Europeanization as “processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and, (c) 
institutionalization of formal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs 
and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the 




Major, opposed the integration of social policy at the European level because of the 
belief that integrating social policy at the European level would result in the European 
Economic Community adopting interventionist and protectionist policies that would 
undermine Britain’s neoliberal reforms by bringing, “socialism [...] through the back 
door” (Thatcher, 1988, 23). Furthermore, it was believed that the integration of social 
policy would jeopardise Britain’s economic efficiency and competitiveness because it 
would undermine the laissez-faire nature of Britain’s economy. Consequently, Britain, 
influenced by the notion that social policy integration was incongruent with Britain’s 
preferences, opted-out of the EU’s social policy when it was integrated through the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. This ensured that London retained control over Britain’s 
social policy, but it meant that it did not get the opportunity to shape the EU’s policies 
(Allen, 2013, 112; Dinan, 2014, 320). Although the succeeding Labour Government 
under Tony Blair’s premiership opted-in to the EU’s social policy, it was unable to 
upload its domestic preferences through the intergovernmental negotiations, which 
produced the Amsterdam Treaty because its social policy provisions remained 
consistent with those affirmed in the Maastricht Treaty (Liddle, 2014, 40,276-277; 
Wall, 2008, 121-127). Therefore, Cameron perceived that Britain had a negligible 
influence over the development of the EU’s social security policies, which affected the 
utility of free movement, and sought to reshape Britain’s obligations to the EU’s 
policies so that it conformed to Britain’s preferences. 
Single Market 
The shape of Cameron's proposal was also influenced by his desire to maintain 
Britain’s access to the single market. He proposed in-work benefit restrictions because 
he believed that it effectively balanced his competing interests of regaining control of 
Britain’s immigration and social welfare policies whilst maintaining access to the single 
market. If Cameron had proposed a policy that overtly undermined the principle of 
free movement, such as a quota system, which he initially preferred (Graham, 2014, 1), 
it would have likely resulted in the EU restricting Britain’s access to the single market 
because free movement is a fundamental component of market integration (Crisp, 
2016, 1). Even if Britain withdrew from the EU, it would not be able to access the single 
market if it did not adhere to the principle of free movement. The Cameron 
Government sought to maintain access to the single market because it was the aspect 
of European integration that it valued the most; London significantly shaped the single 
market, which meant that it conformed with Britain’s preferred conception of the EU 
and it advanced Britain’s economic interests. Furthermore, the perception that the 
single market was economically beneficial was prevalent amongst the British public, 
and business and political elites (Home Office, 2014, 25-52). Although it is difficult to 
precisely quantify the extent to which the single market advanced Britain's economic 
interests, Ilzkovitz et al (2007, 56), and Boltho and Eichengreen (2008, 1) estimate that 
the single market raised EU’s GDP by 2.2% and 5%, respectively. Although these 
studies do not specifically analyse the extent to which Britain benefited from access to 
the single market, it can be assumed that it raised Britain’s GDP because it facilitated 
greater economic liberalisation and labour market flexibility, which stimulated 
economic growth (Portes, 2015a, 1). Furthermore, estimates before the referendum 
suggested that losing access to the single market would reduce Britain’s GDP by 
between 1.1 and 3.1% (Dhingra, Ottaviano & Sampson, 2015, 7). British businesses also 
valued the single market because it provided them with access to other member states' 
markets and a source of unlimited cheap labour, particularly from A8 and A2 member 
states, which was conducive to business growth. However, not all British businesses 
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benefitted from the single market because businesses who did not export their outputs 
had to conform to the EU’s costly regulatory standards. It was necessary for Cameron’s 
proposal to reflect Britain’s business interests because they are an important source of 
support for the Conservatives. Furthermore, the public valued access to the single 
market because it provided consumers with more product choices and lower prices due 
to increased competition within the market. British citizens also valued the right to 
reside and work in other member states (Cameron, 2015b, 4-7; Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2014, 35-50; Home Office, 2014, 25-52). Therefore, 
Cameron proposed in-work benefits restrictions because he perceived that it effectively 
balanced his competing preferences of reshaping the EU's free movement and social 
security coordination policies so that they advanced Britain's perceived interests, while 
retaining the benefits that access to the single market provided Britain. 
Britain’s Domestic Preferences 
Social Factors 
Cameron sought to restrict EU migrants’ access to in-work benefits to reduce Britain’s 
high positive net-migration rate by reducing the pull factors, which made Britain an 
attractive destination state for EU migrants. The Conservative Government sought to 
reduce Britain’s total net-migration rate, because they perceived that Britain’s 
consistently high rates of net-migration were economically and socially unsustainable 
(Conservative Party, 2010, 21; Conservative Party, 2015, 29-31; Robinson, 2013, 73-
74). Britain’s experience with A8 immigration exacerbated Britain’s contemporary 
anti-EU immigrant sentiment because it perceived that A8 migration negatively 
affected Britain’s economy, overburdened its public services, including the welfare 
system, and exacerbated social tension. Furthermore, the notion that Britain already 
had an expanding population exacerbated Britain’s perception that consistently high 
levels of net-migration were unsustainable, because they believed that it would 
overburden Britain’s public services and labour market. Although the Cameron 
Government had the authority to overtly restrict third country immigration, and had 
implemented highly restrictive immigration control barriers (Cameron, 2014, 1; 
Conservative Party, 2015, 29-31), it could not overtly restrict EU migrants’ right to 
enter and reside in Britain without violating the principle of free movement. Due to the 
contemporary shape of the EU's free movement policies, if Britain overtly restricted 
EU immigration, it would be overturned by the ECJ and the EU would likely restrict 
Britain’s access to the single market (Crisp, 2016, 1; Graham, 2014, 1). Hence, Cameron 
perceived that restricting EU migrants’ access to social benefits in Britain was the best 
mechanism that could be utilised to reduce the high levels of EU immigration to Britain 
without overtly undermining the principle of free movement. This is because he 
believed that Britain’s comparatively generous and accessible benefit entitlements, 
including for those in employment, were a significant pull factor, which encouraged 
EU immigration to Britain, particularly from A8 and A2 member states (Cameron, 
2014, 1; Cameron, 2015b, 7-8). Furthermore, the public supported restricting 
immigration from the EU; only 59% and 53% of Britons supported EU migrants’ right 
to work and live in the EU-28, respectively, which were the second lowest and the 
lowest levels of support amongst member states (European Commission, 2015, 45-46). 
However, this perception was somewhat tenuous as employment opportunities and 
favourable income differentials, including Britain’s comparatively generous minimum 
wage, were more significant pull factors for EU migrants than being able to access 




approach sought to exploit the public’s negative perceptions towards EU migrants to 
justify restrictions that sought to reduce EU immigration to Britain without overtly 
undermining the principle of free movement. 
Economic Factors 
Cameron’s proposal to restrict in-work benefits for recent EU migrants was also 
influenced by his desire to reduce the prevalence of EU migrants who received social 
benefits in Britain. Like Cameron’s restrictions to the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) and 
Universal Credit for economically inactive EU migrants, this preference was based on 
the belief that EU migrants, irrespective of their economic status, should not be 
allowed to receive public benefits until they had contributed to Britain’s economy. This 
was exacerbated by the belief that Britain lacked the authority to significantly control 
its welfare policies towards EU migrants in the UK, which may be symptomatic of a 
broader fear European integration would pervade other policy areas, which were 
typically the purview of domestic policy makers. Hence, Cameron believed that it was 
necessary to reshape the EU’s social security regulations so that they accounted for 
variations in member states’ social security systems so that it conformed to a member 
states’ contemporary interests. Specifically, Cameron sought to provide Britain with 
the safeguards against benefit tourism that were embedded into conservative welfare 
systems of continental Europe. Furthermore, Cameron sought to reshape the EU's free 
movement and social security coordination policies so that they conformed with his 
preferred conception of these policies; he believed that member states should have the 
authority to control free movement and welfare benefits because they were not 
“unqualified right[s]” that citizens of EU member states automatically received 
(Cameron, 2015b, 7), and that the EU’s policies should promote the "the right to work, 
not to claim” regardless of their economic activity (Cameron in Hewitt, 2015, 1). 
Cameron believed that it was necessary to restrict EU migrants' access to in-work 
benefits because they overburdened Britain’s economy, which was exacerbated by the 
trend of significant consistent rates of high positive net-migration from the EU-28. He 
asserted that approximately 40% of recent EU migrants to the UK received some form 
of British welfare assistance, and that over 400,000 EU migrants received in-work 
benefits, at an average rate of £6,000 per person, per annum (Cameron, 2014, 1; 
Cameron, 2015b, 8). Based on Cameron’s assertions, Britain spends approximately 
£2.4b on in-work benefits for EU migrants, per annum. However, these claims are 
tenuous because Cameron refused to announce the exact cost of EU migrants in-work 
benefit receipt (Dathan, 2016a, 1; Nardelli, 2016, 1). Furthermore, Britain spent £814m 
on Department of Work and Pensions in-work expenditure for EU migrants in the 
2013/14 financial year, which comprised 16% of Britain's in-work expenditure 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2016, 5). Moreover, EU migrants do not 
overburden Britain’s economy because they make a net fiscal contribution to the 
government’s budget; it totalled around +£20 billion between 2001 and 2011, 
including around +£5 billion by A10 migrants, which was significant because they were 
perceived to the most burdensome of EU migrants (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014, 595). 
Therefore, Cameron’s proposal was primarily influenced by the perceptions amongst 
parts of the general public that EU migrants overburdened Britain’s economy by 
exploiting its welfare system. 
Cameron's proposal, which sought to reduce immigration from the EU, was also 
influenced by the perception that EU migrants had a negative impact on Britain’s 
labour market. Accordingly, he sought to reshape the EU’s contemporary free 
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movement policies to increase the extent to which they advanced Britain’s interests, 
from his perspective. Cameron claimed that the influx of immigrant workers, including 
from the EU-28, negatively affected Britain’s labour market because it increased 
unemployment and decreased wages amongst British workers due to the increased 
competition for jobs (Cameron, 2015c, 1). This perception was prevalent amongst 
cleavages of the British public and political elite (Natcen Social Research, 2014, 84-93; 
Portes, 2015b, 1). It was perceived that they lowered wages because they tended to gain 
employment in low-skilled jobs, even if they were overqualified for these positions and 
were willing to work for lower wages than British workers, which overcrowded the 
lower end of Britain's labour market (Home Office, 2014, 31-37; House of Lords, 2008, 
28; Fic, Holland, & Paluchowski, 2011, 46). This perception was particularly prevalent 
towards A8 citizens due to the influx of migrants from these member states after 2004. 
There was strong anecdotal evidence that EU migrants increased unemployment 
amongst British workers, particularly amongst low-skilled workers. The notion that 
migrant workers gained employment in 90% of newly created jobs, between 1997 and 
2010, exacerbated this perspective (Cameron, 2015c, 1). Statistical analyses produced 
different results about the actual effect that EU migrants had on unemployment and 
wages. Most studies estimated that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that EU 
migrants significantly affected the British labour market (House of Lords, 2008, 58-
61; Migration Advisory Committee [MAC], 2010, 7; Migration Watch, 2012, 1; Portes, 
2015b, 1). However, it appears that free movement had an uneven impact on different 
sectors of the British labour market and it exacerbated socio-economic disparities 
amongst British workers based on the workers’ skill level. Regardless, the negative 
labour market effects were less significant in reality than they were feared to be, 
although these negative perceptions remained prevalent, presumably based on a given 
individual’s fears that EU immigration may have negative effects on their position 
within the labour market. Therefore, Cameron’s desire to reduce the pull factors of EU 
migration to Britain by restricting in-work benefits reflected the prevalent perception 
that EU migrants negatively affected Britain's labour market. 
Political Factors 
Cameron's proposal was influenced by his belief that he needed to balance the 
Conservatives’ internal party preferences with that of European level actors. He sought 
an agreement that would protect his standing within the Conservative Party, whilst 
ensuring that Britain remained in a reformed EU that advanced the UK’s European 
interests and domestic preferences. The framing of his proposed in-work benefit 
restrictions was particularly important because it was viewed as a litmus test for 
Britain’s future relationship with the EU. On the one hand, it was necessary for 
Cameron to pander to the Conservative Party’s powerful eurosceptic faction — who 
sought to regain meaningful control of Britain’s immigration and social security 
policies — to protect his position within the party. Cameron risked losing the support 
of his party if he did not announce proposals which conformed with these preferences 
because two-thirds of Conservative MPs were willing to vote in favour of Britain leaving 
the EU (Helm & McDonald, 2016, 1), including half of Cabinet and his faction of the 
party (Dathan, 2016b, 1; Rose, 2015, 1). On the other hand, it was necessary for 
Cameron to announce a relatively moderate proposal, which did not overtly undermine 
the principle of free movement because he needed to gain support from the EU and 
other member states, who sought to uphold this principle, for his proposal to be 
implemented (Leonard, 2015, 1-2; Ruparel, Booth & Scarpetta, 2015, 5,7-11). This was 




to remain in the EU, as he believed that a reformed EU would advance Britain’s 
interests. However, Cameron had previously stated that he would only support Britain 
remaining in the EU if his EU reform agenda was supported in intergovernmental 
negotiations (Cameron, 2013, 1; Cameron, 2015b, 6-7), in which his in-work benefit 
restriction proposal was a bellwether for Cameron's success. Cameron's support for 
remaining in the EU was considered important because it maximised the probability 
of this occurring; his support for the ‘in’ campaign was estimated to swing public 
opinion by 2.8% in favour of this option, which could prove decisive in what appears 
to be a close referendum (Menon, 2015, 1). Furthermore, as Cameron signaled his 
preference for Britain to remain in the EU, a Brexit would likely damage his position 
within the Conservative Party because it would be viewed as a diplomatic failure, which 
would foster doubts about his leadership, in spite of whether he ultimately supports 
the ‘in’ or ‘out’ campaign (Rose, 2015, 1). Although Cameron’s proposal did not satisfy 
some Conservative MPs, or European level actors, he believed that this proposal was 
the most effective way to balance their competing interests to achieve support from 
both groups. 
Cameron’s decision to propose in-work benefit restrictions to recent EU migrants 
reflected his belief that it was necessary to limit the electoral threat that UKIP posed to 
the Conservative Government in the lead up to the 2015 election. This pressured 
Cameron to adopt a more assertive and eurosceptic approach to British-EU relations, 
which influenced Cameron’s decision to renegotiate the terms of, and announce a 
referendum on, Britain’s membership of the EU. Before the rise of UKIP, the 
Conservative Party, under Cameron’s leadership, had utilised a “best not mentioned” 
approach to European issues because they believed it precluded the party gaining the 
widespread public support which was required to form government (Bale, 2006, 388). 
Furthermore, Cameron sought to avoid the intra-party divisions resulting from past 
Conservative Government’s European policies, which contributed to the downfall of 
the Thatcher and Major premierships. However, this approach became untenable after 
the rise in UKIP support in the 2013 local and by-elections (Gifford, 2014, 512-513; 
Gruber & Bale, 2014, .250-251), because they increased the political salience of 
European issues and euroscepticism amongst the public and political elite. The 
Cameron Government responded to this threat by adopting a soft eurosceptic approach 
and increasingly recognised the issues in British-EU relations. Notably, Cameron 
announced the in-work benefit restriction proposal in the Conservative Party’s 2015 
election manifesto, and this policy conformed to UKIP’s eurosceptic and anti-
immigration policies. It sought to demonstrate to the public that the Conservatives 
were using an assertive approach in their relations with the EU, and that they 
considered reclaiming control of immigration and social welfare policies to be 
important. However, the policy was still relatively moderate, which sought to ensure 
that it did not diminish widespread public support for the Conservatives. This policy 
sought to alleviate the electoral threat that UKIP posed to the Conservatives in the 2015 
election, by reducing the number of traditional Conservative voters, from the 
important eurosceptic right voter cleavages, who voted for UKIP. The Conservatives 
considered this necessary because they feared that UKIP would prevent them from 
gaining the support required to gain a parliamentary majority (Lynch, 2015, 196; 
Lynch & Whitaker, 2013, 308). Furthermore, this approach sought to maximise the 
probability of the Conservatives forming government if it failed to gain a parliamentary 
majority because it demonstrated that the Conservatives would be willing to make 
policy concessions to UKIP in exchange for their support of a Conservative-led 
Government (Gruber & Bale, 2014, 241; Lynch, 2015, 193). Accordingly, Cameron’s 
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decision to announce a referendum and renegotiate the terms of Britain’s membership 
to the EU — including the in-work benefit restrictions proposal which was a litmus test 
for the future of British-EU relations — sought to reduce the electoral threat that UKIP 
posed to the Conservatives, without jeopardising its support amongst other important 
voter cleavages. 
Conclusion 
This article seeks to understand Britain’s perspectives and preferences towards the 
EU’s free movement and social security coordination policies by analysing the 
Cameron premiership’s proposal to restrict in-work benefits for EU migrants in the 
lead up to the Brexit referendum. Britain’s preferred conceptions of statehood and 
European integration, and perceived domestic preferences were the most significant 
determinants of its approaches and interests to the EU’s policies. Britain favoured 
economic integration that advanced its interests and did not undermine its 
sovereignty. London’s preferences also reflected its desire to balance their perceived 
European interests. Cameron sought to re-direct sovereignty to London so that it could 
control Britain’s immigration and social welfare policies, whilst ensuring that the 
policy did not overtly undermine free movement, as it would jeopardise British access 
to the single market. Cameron sought to restrict Britain’s obligations to the EU’s 
policies because he believed that they did not advance Britain’s national and economic 
interests, which reflected London’s negligible role in shaping the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties. Further, Cameron’s approach reflected prevalent domestic 
perceptions towards EU migrants’ right to enter, reside, work and access benefits. 
Cameron sought to reduce EU migration and their access to benefits, and they 
perceived that EU migrants had broadly negative effects on British society and the 
economy. Intra- and inter-party bargaining also affected Cameron’s approach and 
preferences. 
This is an important case study in European integration because there is an increasing 
trend of member states restricting or attempting to restrict EU migrants’ rights to 
access social benefits within their jurisdiction. Member states’ decisions to restrict or 
attempt to restrict EU citizens’ rights to free movement and social benefits in a host 
member state has significant implications for the European integration project. These 
rights are intrinsically linked because the EU’s social security coordination regulations 
provide EU citizens with social rights and protections in a host member state, which 
promote and incentivise free movement. It also affirms the principle of non-
discrimination irrespective of nationality, which is a core component of free 
movement. Restricting or undermining the principle of free movement threatens the 
existence, contemporary shape and future trajectory of the EU because it is a 
fundamental treaty right and one of the most important achievements of the European 
integration project. It is also a vital component of the EU as a political and economic 
project because it promotes market integration and closer connections between 
member states’ citizens and governments. Hence, it is particularly concerning that 
Cameron attached proposals to restrict social rights to Britain’s referendum on its 
membership to the EU, which was a litmus test on the future of British-EU relations, 
because it threatened the contemporary shape of the EU, regardless of whether 
Cameron’s proposal was implemented, or the shape that it took. This resulted in a 
situation where, on the one hand, if Britain remained in the EU, it was likely that 
Cameron’s proposal would be implemented or partially implemented through EU 




EU. On the other hand, Cameron’s failure to reform the EU so that it conformed with 
his proposal – to a degree that was acceptable to the general public – was a significant 
factor in Britain’s decision to vote for Brexit , which has created uncertainty and looks 
to undermine the contemporary shape of the European integration project. The 
extensive negotiations that have occurred since Britain voted to withdraw from the EU 
have underlined the difficulty for the EU and its other member states to reconcile these 
competing interests in a way that does not affect the contemporary conception and the 
future trajectory of the EU. 
It is likely that comparable issues will continue to persist between the EU and its 
member states in the future because the contemporary shape of integration is not 
working effectively. The contemporary shape of these policies attempts to balance 
member states’ interests without really satisfying anyone’s interests because they have 
competing perspectives and domestic preferences towards the EU’s free movement 
and social security coordination policies, which are difficult to reconcile. Therefore, it 
appears that the contemporary equilibrium of integration in these policy areas needs 
to be readjusted, by providing member states with greater control of their national 
immigration and social security policies or by further integrating these policy areas so 
that member states do not have the ability to restrict EU citizens’ free movement or 
social rights. These issues reflect the way in which member states have largely failed to 
develop a collective Europeanised identity because they view their citizens differently 
from European citizens from other member states. Furthermore, member states 
generally prioritise their domestic preferences when they shape and adapt to the 
European integration process. 
Bibliography 
Allen. D. (2013). The United Kingdom: Towards Isolation and a Parting of Ways?. In 
S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (Eds.), The Member States of the European Union (pp. 
109-133). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bale, T. (2006) Between a Soft and a Hard Place? The Conservative Party, Valence 
Politics and the Need for a New “Euro-realism.” Parliamentary Affairs, 59(3), 385-
400. 
Benton, M., Petrovic, M. (2013). How Free Is Free Movement? Dynamics and Drivers 
of Mobility within the European Union. Rotterdam: Migration Policy Institute 
Europe. 
Boltho, A., & Eichengreen, B. (2008). The Economic Impact of European Integration 
(Discussion Paper No. 6820). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Cameron, D. (2013, January 23). EU Speech presented at Bloomberg. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg.  
Cameron, D. (2014, November 28). Prime Minister’s Speech presented at JCB 
Staffordshire. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/jcb-
staffordshire-prime-ministers-speech.  
Cameron, D. (2015a, November 10). A New Settlement for the United Kingdom in a 
Reformed European Union (Letter to Donald Tusk). Retrieved from 





Cameron, D. (2015b, November 10). The Future of Britain's Relationship with the EU 
speech presented at Catham House. Retrieved from 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/events/special/20151110
DavidCameron%20%28NEW%29.pdf.  
Cameron, D. (2015c, May 21). Prime Minister’s Speech on Immigration presented 
ahead of the Queen’s Speech. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-immigration. 
Conservative Party. (1983). Conservative General Election Manifesto. London: 
Conservative Party.  
Conservative Party. (1983). (1986). Conservative General Election Manifesto. 
London: Conservative Party. 
Conservative Party. (1983). (2015). Conservative General Election Manifesto. 
London: Conservative Party. 
Costello, C., Hancox, E. (2014). The UK, EU Citizenship and Free Movement of 
Persons. The Migration Observatory. Retrieved from 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/UK_EU_Citizenship
%20_Free_Movement.pdf.  
Crisp, J. (2016). House of Lords Warned EU will Punish UK if it Votes for Brexit. 
EurActiv. Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/uk-europe/house-lords-
warned-eu-will-punish-uk-if-it-votes-brexit-320944.  
Cusick, J. (2016). EU Referendum: David Cameron’s Touted EU Deal Could Face 
Legal Challenge, Experts Warn. The Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-david-cameron-s-
touted-eu-deal-could-face-legal-challenge-experts-warn-a6804466.html.  
Dathan, M. (2016a). Minister admits David Cameron has no 'factual evidence' to 
prove 'benefit tourism' causes mass EU migration. The Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/minister-admits-david-cameron-
has-no-factual-evidence-to-prove-benefit-tourism-causes-mass-eu-a6802326.html.  
Dathan, M. (2016b). EU Referendum: David Cameron Dodges Question over whether 
he'll resign if he loses EU vote. The Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-david-cameron-
dodges-question-over-whether-hell-resign-if-he-loses-eu-vote-a6797946.html.  
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. (2014). Review of the Balance of 
Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union Single Market: 






Department for Work and Pensions. (2016). DWP benefit expenditure on EEA 
national-led claims 2013/14 (Public Expenditure: Statistical Analyses 2016). 
Westminster: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.  
Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G., Sampson, T. (2015). Should We Stay or Should We Go? 
The Economic Consequences of Leaving the EU (Report No. EA022). London: 
London School of Economics and Political Science.  
Dinan, D. (2014). A Special Case: The United Kingdom and the European Union. In 
D. Dinan (Ed.) Origins and Evolution of the European Union (pp. 305-326). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Dustmann, C., & Frattini, T. (2014). The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK. The 
Economic Journal, 124(580), F593-F643. 
European Commission. (2015). Standard Eurobarometer 83 - Spring 2015 - Public 
Opinion in the European Union, Tables of Results. Brussels: European Commission. 
Fic, T., Holland, D., & Paluchowski, P. (2011). Labour Mobility within the EU – The 
Impact of Enlargement and the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements 
(Discussion Paper No. 379). London: National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1984). Europe — The Future. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 23(1), 73-81. 
Gifford, C. (2014). The People Against Europe: The Eurosceptic Challenge to the 
United Kingdom's Coalition Government. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(3), 
512-528. 
Graham, G. (2014). David Cameron's Plans to Limit Immigration through Quotas for 




Gruber, O., & Bale, T. (2014). And it’s Good Night Vienna. How (Not) to Deal with the 
Populist Radical Right: The Conservatives, UKIP and some Lessons from the 
Heartland. British Politics, 9, 237–254. 
Helm, T., & McDonald, H. (2016). Two-Thirds of Tory MPs want Britain to Quit 
European Union. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jan/09/tory-mps-britain-european-
union-eu-brexit.  
Hewitt, G. (2015). David Cameron's complex balancing act on Europe. BBC. 
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35094352.  
Home Office. (2014). Review of the Balance of Competences between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union Single Market: Free Movement of Persons. 
Retrieved from 





House of Lords. (2008). The Economic Impact of Immigration. (Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs: 1st Report of Session 2007–08). London: The Stationery Office 
Limited. 
Ilzkovitz, F., Dierx, A., Kavocs, V. & Sousa, N. (2007) Steps Towards a Deeper 
Economic Integration: The Internal Market in the 21st Century – a Contribution to 
the Single Market Review (European Economy No. 271). Brussels: European 
Commission. 
Leonard, M. (2015). Britain in Europe Renegotiation Scorecard. European Council on 
Foreign Relations. Retrieved from 
http://www.ecfr.eu/europeanpower/britain/renegotiation#.  
Liddle, R. (2014). The Europe Dilemma: Britain and the Drama of EU Integration. 
New York: I.B. Tauris. 
Lynch, P. (2015). Conservative Modernisation and European Integration: From 
Silence to Salience and Schism. British Politics, 10, 185-203. 
Lynch, P. & Whitaker, R. (2013). Rivalry on the right: The Conservatives, the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) and the EU issue. British Politics, 8(3), 285-312. 
Menon, A. (2015). Cameron’s real test is in Westminster not Brussels. The UK in a 
Changing Europe. Retrieved from http://ukandeu.ac.uk/camerons-real-test-is-in-
westminster-not-brussels/.  
Migration Advisory Committee. (2010). Limits on Migration: Limits on Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 for 2011/12 and supporting policies. London: Home Office. 
Migration Watch. (2012). Economic Impacts of Immigration to the UK (Briefing 
Paper 1.29). Retrieved from http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/pdfs/BP1_29.pdf.  
Moravcsik, A. (1991). Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and 
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community. International Organization, 
45(1), 19-56. 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Nardelli, A. (2016). Key Data on Migrant Benefit Claimants Being Hidden, Tom 
Watson says. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jan/08/hmrc-key-data-migrant-benefit-
claimants-hidden-tom-watson-labour.  
NatCen Social Research. (2014). British Social Attitudes (Report No. 31). London: 
NatCen Social Research.  
Parliament and Council Directive (EC). 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 




Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 
75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. (2004). Official Journal of 
the European Union, L158/ 77. 
Parliament and Council Regulation (EC). 883/2004 of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems. (2004). Official Journal of the European 
Union, L166/1. 
Parliament and Council Regulation (EC). 987/2009 of 16 September 2009 on laying 
down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems (2009). Official Journal of the European 
Union, L284/1. 
Portes, J. (2015a). Migrants, Benefits and the UK's Renegotiation. National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research. Retrieved from 
http://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/migrants-benefits-and-uks-renegotiation-questions-
and-answers-updated#.Vrawz-sWXzK.  
Portes, J. (2015b). The Benefits of Immigration. The UK in a Changing Europe. 
Retrieved from http://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-benefits-of-immigration/. 
Radaelli, C. M. (2003). The Europeanization of Public Policy. In K. Featherstone & 
C.M. Radaelli (Eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (pp.27-56). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Robinson, D. (2013). Migration policy Under the Coalition Government. People, 
Place and Policy, 7(2), 73-81. 
Rose, R. (2015). Disaster Scenario for Cameron on Europe. The UK in a Changing 
Europe. Retrieved from http://ukandeu.ac.uk/disaster-scenario-for-cameron-on-
europe/.  
Ruparel, R., Booth, S., Scarpetta, V. (2015). Where do EU Countries Stand on the 
UK’s EU reform Demands?. Open Europe. Retrieved from 
http://openeurope.org.uk/intelligence/britain-and-the-eu/open-europes-eu-reform-
heat-map-where-do-eu-countries-stand-on-the-uks-eu-reform-demands/.  
Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2015). Freedom of Movement in the EU. The UK in a Changing 
Europe. Retrieved from http://ukandeu.ac.uk/freedom-of-movement-in-the-eu/.  
Thatcher, M. (1988, October 14). Speech to Conservative Party Conference presented 
at Conference Centre, Brighton 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], Consolidated Version, 
2012. C326/47. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.  
Wall, S. (2008). A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Young, H. (1999). The Bless Plot, Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. 
Basingstoke and London: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Milton, ANZJES 10(2) 
 
16 
Young, J.W. (2000). Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999. London: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
